Mechanism design in school choice. Some lessons in a nutshell

Flip Klijn
Insitute for Economic Analysis (CSIC)
Campus UAB, Bellaterra (Barcelona)
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  • Abstract
    This paper deals with school choice as an application of matching theory. Although the use of matching theory for the design and study of school choice mechanisms is rather recent, some of its tools were already successfully employed in several other markets, the most noticeable being the labor market for medical doctors in the US. I first briefly describe the problems that some US school districts had, and why and how economic engineering has contributed a lot to the improvement of school choice programs. Then, I will review and interpret a selection of the most recent developments and results.
  • Keywords: school choice, matching, stability, efficiency, strategy-proofness, preference revelation, indifferences.
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