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A survey on assignment games and related markets

Josep M. Izquierdo
Departament de Matemàtica Econòmica, Financera i Actuarial
Universitat de Barcelona
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Marina Núñez
Departament de Matemàtica Econòmica, Financera i Actuarial
Universitat de Barcelona
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Carles Rafels
Departament de Matemàtica Econòmica, Financera i Actuarial
Universitat de Barcelona
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  • Abstract
    In this survey we collect the main results on the bilateral assignment game that have been developed since this model of cooperative game was introduced by Shapley and Shubik (1972). The core, the von Neumann- Morgenstern stable sets, the kernel and some single-valued solutions like the  tau-value and the nucleolus are considered. Finally, several examples show that some good properties of the core of these games, such as its nonemptiness and its lattice structure, may be lost if we extend the model in different directions, for instance dropping the assumptions of bilaterality or unitary demand and supply.
  • Keywords: assignment game, core, stable set, kernel, tau value, nucleolus.
  • AMS Subject classifications: 91A12, 91A46.